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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Establishment Clause of the First Amendment-Free
Textbook Loans to Pupils in Private Schools Held Constitutional.-Plain-
tiffs, members of a local New York board of education, challenged the con-
stitutionality of section 701 of the New York Education Law which requires
that textbooks be lent free of charge to students attending private schools.'
The New York Court of Appeals had held by a 4-3 vote that section 701
violated neither article XI, section 3 of the New York Constitution nor the
first amendment to the Federal Constitution.2 On appeal the New York decision
was affirmed,3 the Supreme Court holding that section 701 does not violate
the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
In 1965 the New York State Legislature amended section 701 of the
Education Law to require boards of education "to purchase and to loan upon
individual request, to all children residing in such district who are enrolled in
grades seven to twelve of a public or private school which complies with the
compulsory education law, text-books." 4 These textbooks were to be loaned
free of charge and were to be such textbooks as are "designated for use in any
public, elementary or secondary schools of the state or are approved by any
boards of education, trustees or other school authorities."5
In light of the numerous state court decisions concerning state aid to private
and parochial schools in recent years,6 it is surprising to note that the instant
case marks the first time in over twenty years that the Supreme Court has
directly confronted the problem of the relationship between such aid and the
Establishment Clause of the first amendment.7 As long ago as 1930 the Court
was faced with a Louisiana law almost identical to section 701 under which
textbooks were loaned free of charge to pupils attending private schools.8
1. N.Y. Educ. Law § 701 (Supp. 1967).
2. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967).
3. There was considerable discussion of appellants' standing to challenge in the lower
New York courts. The appellate division found that they lacked standing. 27 App. Div. 2d
69, 276 N.Y.S.2d 234 (3d Dep't 1966). The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, ruling
that they did have standing to sue. 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.YS.2d 799
(1967). The question was not raised in the Supreme Court. Appellants' problem was that
since they had sworn to uphold the Federal Constitution, which they believed the textbook
law violated, they had to either not comply with § 701 and risk removal from office, or
else violate their oath. 392 U.S. at 241 n.5.
4. N.Y. Educ. Law § 701(3) (Supp. 1967).
5. Id.
6. See note 25 infra.
7. The last time the Supreme Court considered the issue was in Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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Although the Court there did not pass upon any first amendment contention,
and rejected the argument that the law condoned a public taking for a private
purpose in violation of the fifth amendment, the decision relates to the present
case inasmuch as the Court adopted what has become known as the "child"
or "pupil benefit" theory.10 This theory construes such aid as inuring to the
advantage of the individual student and not as aiding the schools themselves.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for that unanimous Court, restated with
approval the findings of the Louisiana court: "The appropriations were made
for the specific purpose of purchasing school books for the use of the school
children of the state, free of cost to them. It was for their benefit and the
resulting benefit to the state that the appropriations were made .... The schools
, * . are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations."'" The Court made it
clear that it considered the state's interest in a student's education to relate to
public welfare and not the religious welfare of the student. "Its interest is
education, broadly; its method, comprehensive."' 2
This decision, however, did not resolve the constitutionality of such aid, for,
as was remarked a few years ago, "[u] ntil the Supreme Court has the establish-
ment clause directly before it in a textbook case, the constitutionality of
using public funds to provide textbooks for parochial school students is open
to doubt."' 3 The instant case seems to have resolved that doubt.
The first comprehensive treatment which applied the Establishment Clause
to aid to private and parochial schools appeared in Everson v. Board of Edit-
cation.'4 A New Jersey law authorized local school districts to arrange for the
transportation of children to school, including private schools. 15 Pursuant to
this law the Ewing Township Board of Education reimbursed parents for their
children's use of public transportation to Catholic schools. The majority opinion,
written by Mr. Justice Black, upheld the New Jersey law as not violative of
the first amendment prohibition against any law "respecting an establishment
of religion." All of the justices seemed to be in substantial agreement with
Justice Black's language to the effect that neither a state nor the federal
government "can set up a church" or "pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another";' 0 that a state cannot "con-
9. The first amendment was not applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment until Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
10. This theory seems to have originated with Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929), which concerned the same statute as Cochran v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
11. 281 U.S. at 374-75.
12. Id. at 375.
13. LaNoue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportation and Medical
Care, 13 J. Pub. Law 76, 81 (1964).
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. N.J. Laws 1941, ch. 191.
16. 330 U.S. at 15. The decision, however, was by a close 5-4 margin, with vigorous and
lengthy dissents by Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Rutledge.
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tribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the
tenets and faith of any church."' 7
However much in agreement the Court may have been in principle, the ap-
plication of this principle to a given set of circumstances has resulted in disa-
greement. The majority in Everson realized that in protecting against an
establishment of religion they must be careful not to "prohibit New Jersey from
extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to
their religious belief."' 8 In arriving at their decision the majority found that
the legislation in question was a public or general welfare measure, no different
from the police and fire protection accorded parochial schools. The state is
not supporting the schools, but rather "does no more than provide a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools."19
The Court observed, however, that the legislation in question does in some
manner aid the parochial school. Children are helped to get to such schools to
learn, among other things, the teachings of their religion and, without the reim-
bursement, perhaps their parents could not afford to send them to church-
related schools. What then is the test by which the court will determine when
aid breaches the wall of separation between church and state?
An answer came in 1963 in the case of Abington School District v. Schempp20
which ruled that Bible reading in the public schools is unconstitutional.
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Clark set forth a test concurred in by
seven other justices: "[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enact-
ment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitu-
tion. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."' 1 The Court in Everson, while recognizing that
the school received some support, had found a secular purpose and primary
effect which was to enable school children to share in a general welfare measure,
irrespective of the school attended. -2 2
The Everson decision was, however, a close one, and a subsequent development
appeared to weaken its authority somewhat. In Everson Mr. Justice Douglas
was in the five member majority, but a later statement by him indicates that
he had some misgivings about his position in 1947. In a concurring opinion
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 18. It is interesting to note the Court's use of the word "accredited" rather than
a word such as "parochial." Mr. Justice Black noted that these parochial schools seemed to
meet the state's secular educational requirements.
20. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
21. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
22. The child benefit theory can be viewed as merely an aspect of this test, i.e., a secular
purpose which enables children to share in a general welfare measure and a primary effect
which neither advances nor inhibits religion.
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in the school prayer decision, Engel v. Vitale,2 3 he remarked that "[tlhe
Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First Amendment. 1 2 '
After the decision in Everson, a number of state court decisions concerned
state aid to parochial schools in the form of providing transportation or text-
books. In most of these decisions such aid was held violative of state con-
stitutions.25 It should be noted however, that the provisions of most of these
state constitutions impose limitations on state aid to private schools in stricter
and more specific terms than the United States Constitution. 20 Thus the Court
in the instant case rendered its decision against the rather unsure background
of Everson and numerous state court decisions subsequent to Everson."
The Supreme Court in the instant case has reaffirmed the child or pupil
benefit theory and upheld the constitutionality of the New York textbook
loaning law by a solid 6-3 decision. Mr. Justice White writing for the majority
concluded that "we are unable to hold . . . that this statute results in un-
constitutional involvement of the State with religious instruction or that section
701, for this or the other reasons urged, is a law respecting the establishment
of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment.
2 8
The statement of purpose accompanying the law when it was passed by the
New York State Legislature reveals the legislative intent: "It is hereby
declared to be the public policy of the state that the public welfare and safety
require that the state and local communities give assistance to educational
programs which are important to our national defense and the general
welfare of the state."2 9 New York, therefore, characterized its legislation as
a general or public welfare measure, much the same construction given to
the New Jersey law by the. Court in Everson. The Supreme Court concurred
with the state's construction, and affirmed the child benefit theory. The Court
23. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
24. Id. at 443.
25. E.g., Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alas. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 517
(1962); Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44,
258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963); Dickman v.
School Dist., 232 Ore. 328, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); State v.
Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962). Contra, Snyder v. N6wtown, 147 Conn.
374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299 (1961); Quinn v. School Comm.,
332 Mass. 410, 125 N.E.2d 410 (1955).
26. Note, Church-State Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey, 41 Notre
Dame Law. 681 (1966). See, e.g., Del. Const. art. 10, § 3; Okla. Const. art. II, § 5; Wis.
Const. art. I, § 18.
27. Most of these state court holdings rejected the child benefit theory. See, e.g., Matthews
v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alas. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 517 (1962); Board of Educ.
v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963) ; Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Ore. 328, 366 P.2d 533
(1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33
Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949).
28. 392 U.S. at 248.
29. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 320, § 1.
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found that neither books nor funds were furnished to the parochial schools,
but rather they inured to the benefit of the parents and children."0
Such aid can be considered as a general welfare measure because the courts
have long realized that parochial schools fulfill a secular role as well as the ob-
vious religious one.3 ' Mr. Justice White remarked that because Americans con-
sider high quality education a sine qua non of our society "the continued
willingness to rely on private school systems, ... strongly suggests that a wide
segment of informed opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those
schools do an acceptable job of providing secular education to their students."a'
The Court has here implicitly held, then, that there is a secular purpose to the
legislation and that that purpose is intended as its primary effect. The legislation,
therefore, is a valid exercise of the state's power according to the test.33
Although Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in Everson and Justice
Douglas concurred, both wrote vigorous dissents in the present case. Since
they considered books to be the most essential instrumentality of the educational
process, they had no difficulty in distinguishing the transportation aid in Everson
from textbook loaning programs. They feared not only that religious shadings
and propaganda would somehow appear in the books selected by the parochial
schools, although the textbooks to be lent are secular ones (i.e., those which
are suitable for use in public schools as well), but also that this would be
the first step in a process that will continue until the church-state wall of
separation completely crumbles. Mr. Justice Douglas decried the lack of
clear standards by which local school boards are to judge which books are
secular and which are religious, and the fact that the initiative in selecting the
books rests with the parochial school authorities.
Although the majority did not feel that the "processes of secular and religious
learning are so intertwined" that secular textbooks given to parochial school
children would be instrumental in propagating religious beliefs,3 4 and although
they assumed that the books loaned are those "not unsuitable for use in
the public schools because of religious content,"3r, the dangers about which
30. 392 US. at 243-44. The Court noted in a footnote a remark by then Commissioner of
Education Keppel before Senate hearings on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 to the effect that nonpublic schools rarely provide free textbooks. Id. at 244 n.6.
31. Id. at 245; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
32. 392 U.S. at 247-48.
33. See text at note 21 supra. In a separate, concurring opinion, Justice Harlan quoted
other language from the Abington decision: "I would hold that where the contested govern-
mental activity is calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the com-
petence of the State, and where the activity does not involve the States 'so significantly and
directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to ... divisive influences and inhibitions
of freedom,' . . . it is not forbidden by the religious clauses of the First Amendment." 392
U.S. at 249 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 248.
35. Id. at 245.
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Black and Douglas cautioned are certainly not ungrounded.80 The dissenting
opinion of Mr. justice Fortas might prove acceptable to those apprehensive
of the implications of the majority opinion. His dissent seemed to be based
entirely on the fact that the books were to be initially selected by the religious
authorities and then submited to the public school boards for approval. There
seemed to be an implication that he would uphold a textbook loan law if the
books were first selected by the public school authorities so that all schools would
be using the same material.
Whatever be one's personal views on the subject, and the articles and books
written on the subject which set out suggested guidelines and proposed tests
of when such aid is constitutional or not are legion, the instant decision is
consistent with and a natural extension of the Supreme Court's prior decisions
on the subject. Aid in the form of bus transportation for parochial school pu-
pils was upheld in Everson; a released time program whereby public school
pupils could leave classes early to attend religious instruction was approved
in Zorach v. Clauson;37 now textbook loans to parochial schools have been held
constitutional by an even greater majority of the Court. Where the Supreme
Court has drawn the line and where the church-state wall is definitely breached
is where the public school is used as a forum for religious practices. Thus the
Court struck down a released time program where the religious instruction
was given in the public school classroom,38 a Bible reading program in the public
school classroom,39 and a non-denominational prayer recited at the beginning
of the school day in the public school classroom.
40
Regardless of the state court opinions,41 the Court would now appear to
have adopted the child benefit theory, whether the aid be bus transportation
or textbook loans. Though at least some incidental benefits, obviously, do accrue
to the religious institutions receiving such aid, the Court has decided that
they are so incidental and indirect that the legislation condoning them, if other-
wise valid, is not to be struck down.
Adoption of the child benefit theory, however, does not resolve all uncer-
tainties regarding aid to private schools. It is clear that if a state were
to provide for the loaning of religious textbooks, the legislation would be held
unconstitutional even though the child might unquestionably be benefitted.
The status of other forms of aid, such as the construction of physical plant
facilities for private schools, remains problematical.
It appears that there will continue to be disagreement over the basic
question-what is a law "respecting an establishment of religion?" The fun-
36. Mr. Justice Douglas, however, goes to great lengths to give illustrations of various
textual passages in secular textbooks which agree with the tenets of certain religious faiths,
but he does not show or indicate if any of these books ever were or will be approved by any
local school boards.
37. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
38. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
39. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
41. See note 27 supra.
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damental theory of the first amendment may very well have been that church
and state be totally separate, but, as the Court noted in Zorach, "The First
Amendment. . . does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State."42 Indeed, a workable test or guideline is
assuredly the best solution for which one may hope. The test, used by the
instant Court, which looks to the primary purpose and effect of the legislation,
seems to be a reasonable, if not precise or universally applicable, approach
toward such a workable guideline.
Criminal Procedure-Jury Selection-Jury's Imposition of Death Penalty
Held Unconstitutional Where Procedure for Choosing Jurors Eliminated
Those with Scruples Against Capital Punishment Not Amounting to Ab-
solute Opposition.-The petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for
having murdered a policeman while fleeing arrest. The convicting jury had
been selected pursuant to an Illinois statute which read: "In trials for murder
it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined,
state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he
is opposed to the same."' Before petitioner's jury was empanelled, the state
had exercised its option to challenge under this statute- forty-seven times.3 Of
the forty-seven potential jurors so excluded, only five stated that they would
not vote for capital punishment under any circumstances. The others had
merely indicated that to some degree they were opposed to capital punishment
generally or that they had moral or religious scruples against the death
penalty under certain circumstances. The issue raised on appeal was whether a
jury so selected could constitutionally convict and condemn to death a defen-
dant charged with a capital crime. The Supreme Court held that no death
penalty could be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was
selected by dismissing veniremen, for cause, who expressed general objections
to the death penalty or who showed specific conscientious or religious scruples
against its infliction. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Under federal law, and in the vast majority of state jurisdictions,4 the ex-
pression of doubt as to the morality or advisability of capital punishment has
42. 343 U.S. at 312.
1. I]. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 743 (1959). The express language of this statute was not
re-enacted in the 1963 Code of Criminal Procedure, Tit. VI, § 115-4(d). However, in
People v. Hobbs, 35 II. 2d 263, 220 N.E.2d 469 (1966), the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the present statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 115-4(d) (1967), incorporates the former.
2. Such challenges for specific cause are unlimited in number and are to be distinguished
from the definite number of peremptory challenges, i.e., for no specific cause, allowed in
every jurisdiction.
3. This number represents approximately one half of all the veniremen called. Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510, 513 (1968).
4. See Arnot., 48 A.L.R.2d 560 (1956).
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been sufficient to justify the immediate dismissal of a venireman. There has
been no requirement to investigate further his ability to vote for the death
penalty in a particuliar situation where the facts and evidence might so war-
rant.5 The practice originated in the era when conviction of a capital crime
brought an automatic death sentence. The obvious fear was that one who
opposed capital punishment would be quite likely to vote for a verdict of
not guilty, no matter how convincing the evidence, to avoid the inevitable taking
of the defendant's life." The Supreme Court approved this practice in Logan v.
United States,7 reasoning that: "A juror who has conscientious scruples on
any subject, which prevent him from standing indifferent between the govern-
ment and the accused, and from trying the case according to the law and the
evidence, is not an impartial juror."8
The mandatory death penalty has by now been abolished in the United
States.9 In most of the states, as in the federal courts, the jury is called upon
to exercise its discretion as to sentence.10 In New York," California, 12 and
Pennsylvania,13 a separate argument before the jury is conducted on the issue
of the death penalty. This allows the jury to consider more facts concerning the
defendant, his background, and the crime, than is possible under the rules of
evidence in force during the trial. However, despite the elimination of mandatory
death penalties, both federal and state courts have continued to allow chal-
lenges for cause of those with scruples against capital punishment,' even where
5. Id. at 571.
6. 45 N.C.L. Rev. 1070, 1071 (1967).
7. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
8. Id. at 298.
9. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 435 (1966).
10. Id.
11. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.30-.35.
12. Cal. Penal Code § 190.1 (West Supp. 1967).
13. Pa. Stat. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
14. Federal courts have consistently followed Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224 (1902),
which held it no error to dismiss, by challenge for cause, those who stated that they held
conscientious scruples or opinions which would preclude their rendering a guilty verdict in a
case where the death penalty is prescribed by law. In United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1022 (1954), the defendant was convicted of killing an F.B.I.
agent who was on duty at the time. The offense was punishable by death or life imprison-
ment at the discretion of the jury. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1964). The trial judge questioned
all the talesmen as to whether they had any scruples against capital punishment and he
dismissed twelve who expressed such scruples. The court rejected the appellant's claim that
such dismissal deprived him of his right to a jury balanced on the question of capital
punishment. In Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court held
that the dismissal of all prospective jurors who answered the question, "Are you against
capital punishment?," affirmatively was not an error. It also refuted the argument that the
jury was not balanced or drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The court
reasoned that the defendant did have an impartial jury because the initial at random
drawing of names from the voter rolls assured him of an unbiased cross-segment of the
community. The defendant, it was said, is entitled to no more. He should not expect a jury
the penalty prescribed by law was not death but rather the possibility of death,
depending on whether the jury's verdict was guilty or guilty without capital
punishment.' 5 Only the courts of Iowa, 6 and South Dakota' 7 have specifically
denied the prosecution such challenges, although some other states seem to
have been moving in that direction.' 8
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in the instant case, was careful
to point out the narrow scope of the five-to-four decision. The Court in no
way called into doubt procedure by which prospective jurors are challenged
for cause on the ground that they would automatically vote against the
imposition of the death penalty without regard to the facts or evidence pro-
duced at the trial. Nor did the Court question the procedure which allows
challenge for cause where the prospective juror's scruples concerning the
death penalty would prevent him from making an unbiased decision concern-
ing the particular defendant's guilt or innocence. The holding deals only with
the sentence, not the conviction, and concerns the sentence only when it is death.
The case declared unconstitutional any infliction of a death penalty, result-
ing from a jury trial, where the jury has been chosen pursuant to a procedure
allowing the prosecution to challenge for cause any prospective juror who shows
evidence of general conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment
short of absolute and universal opposition. If such a procedure is used by a
state, then the death penalty can no longer be imposed in that state.
The Court did not determine whether a jury devoid of those with scruples
against capital punishment would be more likely to convict a defendant on the
same evidence than would a jury composed of a cross-section of society, without
regard to their feelings toward capital punishment. The theory has been pro-
pounded that those with no scruples against the infliction of the death penalty,
i.e., the "death qualified," are psychologically more prosecution prone than
the rest of society, which has at least some qualms concerning capital punish-
ment.' 9 The Court in the instant case was not at all convinced by the peti-
tioner's repetition of this argument and flatly refused to reverse the conviction
on this ground.20
The holding in the present case may be viewed as a manifestation of one of
the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence. Essential to the concept of
the jury system, as we know it, is a panel which is representative of a fair cross-
which might be prejudiced in his favor. The majority of state courts have followed the
same practice as the federal courts in allowing challenge for cause of prospective jurors who
admit to having scruples against the death penalty. See Annot., 48 A.L.R2d 562, 582 (1956).
15. Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224 (1902).
16. State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 60 N.W. 119 (1894).
17. State v. Garrington, 11 S.D. 178, 76 N.W. 326 (1898).
18. See State v. Narten, 99 Ariz. 116, 407 P.2d 81 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008
(1966); People v. Bandhauer, 66 Cal. 2d 524, 426 P.2d 900, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 878 (1968).
19. See, e.g., Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punish-
ment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 Texas L. Rev. 54S (1961).
20. 391 U.S. at 516-18.
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section of the community.21 Mr. Justice Black said in Smith v. Texas,22 "[i]t
is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of
public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community."2 3
Mr. Justice Douglas, whose concurring vote determined the outcome of the
instant case, agreed with the basic reasoning of the Court but disagreed with
the limited scope of the holding. He reasoned that for a jury to be truly repre-
sentative it should include even those who are absolutely opposed to capital
punishment in any and all cases.2 4
The main thrust of Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion was a disapproval
of the "fair cross-section" argument. Where Mr. Justice Douglas would have
juries include all, no matter what their feelings against capital punishment, and
the rest of the majority would include those who could conceivably vote for the
death penalty, despite some scruples against it, the dissenters agreed with the
traditional reasoning of Logan v. United States25 and the cases that followed it?'
They contended that the state as well as the defendant was entitled to an im-
partial jury and that anyone having scruples against capital punishment would
be inherently biased against the state.2 7
The immediate effect of the instant case will be to invalidate the sentences
of all those, now awaiting execution, who were condemned by juries selected
by procedures allowing challenge for cause against those with any anti-
capital punishment scruples. In deciding that the holding was to be retroactive,
the Court rejected the arguments of the twenty-four states that filed amici curiae
briefs on behalf of Illinois. The briefs contended that since the states had
relied upon Logan v. United States28 in using this jury selection procedure, and
that since the effect of a retroactive holding on criminal justice would be so
great, any decision invalidating the procedure should be prospective only.
However, the Court reasoned that since the standards of jury selection neces-
sarily undermined "the very integrity of the . . . process" that decided the
petitioners' fate, its decision should take effect retroactively. 2
Another significant ramification of the decision will probably be a widespread
change in jury selection procedures in the federal courts and in most state courts.
At the very least, prosecutors in capital cases will question prospective jurors
21. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (those of Mexican descent);
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (women); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217 (1946) (daily wage earners); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942);
Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965) (those unwilling to demonstrate a
belief in God) ; Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.V. 1091 (1925) (Roman Catholics).
22. 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (exclusion of Negroes).
23. Id. at 130.
24. 391 U.S. at 528.
25. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
26. See note 4 supra.
27. 391 U.S. at 535-36: "A person who has conscientious or religious scruples against
capital punishment will seldom if ever vote to impose the death penalty."
28. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
29. 391 U.S. at 523 n.22.
[Vol. 37
CASE NOTES
more extensively than in the past. The purpose of the increased effort will be
to determine the exact degree of any opposition that the prospective juror might
express toward capital punishment. Those who express feelings hostile to the
death penalty will no longer be perfunctorily rejected. It is likely that, in
some instances, prosecutors will attempt to convince the court that a prospective
juror's feelings are so intense that they would prevent him from voting for
a death penalty under any circumstances. The success of such an argument,
in securing the dismissal of a prospective juror, will differ from case to case
and will depend upon the skill of the questioner in eliciting answers that would
clearly show the court that the prospective juror involved is absolutely op-
posed to the death penalty. However, as to the defense counsel, the instant
case will not bring about any major change in his efforts during the jury selec-
tion process. He will continue his endeavors to discover the pro-capital punish-
ment absolutist during voir dire, since such a person is clearly as unacceptable
a juror as his anti-capital punishment counterpart.30
It would seem that the present case is a reflection by the Court of the
changing attitudes of the American people toward the death penalty.31 Indeed
Mr. Justice White, in his dissent, criticizes the Court for interfering with the
legislative decision of the State of Illinois as to what the penalty for murder
should be.32 However, considering the case in a broader scope than did Justice
White, the majority decision appears to be not so much a circumlocutory
attempt by the Court to impose its will and abolish the death penalty as it
is an effort on the Court's part to integrate a growing segment of our popula-
tion into the process of criminal justice at its most serious level.
Torts-Rescue Doctrine-Vital Organ Donee Has No Cause of Action
Against Doctors Whose Negligence Caused Need for Transplant.-
The defendant doctors negligently removed all the kidney tissue from the plain-
tiff's son. As a medical fact the plaintiff's son could not have lived long without
the kidney tissue. His life was preserved with a machine which acted as a sub-
stitute for his natural kidneys, but his health proceeded to fail and death
seemed inevitable. In order to sustain his life it was determined that a trans-
plant of another's kidney would be essential. The plaintiff's kidneys were suit-
able for such a transplant and she volunteered one of her kidneys. The trans-
plant, performed by other doctors, was a success. As a result of the loss of her
kidney, the plaintiff alleged that her health had suffered, and sought damages
30. A recent North Carolina murder conviction was reversed because one of the jurors
was a pro-capital punishment absolutist. The court held that since a person with that
philosophy was allowed to sit on the jury, while those with the slightest anti-capital punish-
ment scruples could be excluded, due process was inevitably denied. Crawford v. Bounds,
395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968).
31. See 2 Polls, International Review on Public Opinion 84 (No. 3 1967).
32. 319 U.S. at 541-42.
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from the doctors who were negligent in the operation on her son. The instant
court concluded that the plaintiff did not allege facts constituting a cause of
action and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, commenting that the
court "is called upon . . . to invent a 'brand new cause of action' presently out-
side our legal concepts of suable tortious wrong." Sirianni v. Anna, 55 Misc. 2d
553, 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
The facts in the instant case call for application of the theory in tort law
commonly referred to as the rescue doctrine,' whereby one who is injured while
reasonably attempting a necessary rescue may recover from the one whose negli-
gence created the situation necessitating the rescue.2 "[This doctrine] holds the
rescuer in a favored position in the eyes of the law. ' 'a The elements of the doc-
trine consist of danger caused by the defendant to the victim, which creates a
situation of immediacy and urgency,4 resulting in injury to the rescuer. Ad-
mittedly, the doctors who removed the tissue were negligent, and clearly their
negligence was dangerous to the plaintiff's son, and created the requisite "situa-
tion." The plaintiff claimed to have sustained injury while "rescuing" her son
from the impending harm.
The instant court raised several objections to the application of the rescue
doctrine in this case.5 The court characterized plaintiff's conduct as "premedi-
tated, knowledgeable and purposeful," and noted that it "did not extend or
reactivate the consummated negligence of these defendants."0 But it is well
recognized that the doctrine is not limited to spontaneous or instinctive action,
but applies even where there is time for thought.7 In Wagner v. International
Railway Co.8 the victim of defendant's negligence was injured after falling to
the ground from a moving train. When the plaintiff realized what had hap-
pened he proceeded to "rescue." He had time to weigh the situation and to
choose his course of action. He made his choice and was injured in the process of
rescuing. In Wagner the defendant argued that the chain of negligence must stop
when action ceases to be instinctive.9 The court concluded that what the de-
fendant meant by this was "that rescue is at the peril of the rescuer, unless
spontaneous and immediate. If there has been time to deliberate, if impulse has
given way to judgement, one cause, it is said, has spent its force, and another has
1. W. Prosser, Torts § 51, at 316 (3d ed. 1964) ; see 3 Okla. L. Rev. 476 (1950).
2. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 558 (1965).
3. 3 Okla. L. Rev. 476 (1950) (footnote omitted).
4. Provenzo v. Sam, 27 App. Div. 2d 442, 444, 280 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (4th Dep't 1967).
5. Sirianni v. Anna, 55 Misc. 2d 553, 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
6. Id.
7. W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 317. In Luce v. Hartman, 5 App. Div. 2d 19, 168 N.Y.S.2d
501 (4th Dep't 1957), the court in holding the plaintiff not to be a "rescuer," decided that
an element needed before an "act should be deemed a 'rescue' . . . should be the condition of
immediacy and urgency . . . where a life hung in the balance." Id. at 22, 168 N.Y.S.2d at
505. It is true that the instant rescue did not take place at the scene of the negligence, when
the emergency first arose, but no less an emergency existed-a life hung in the balance.
8. 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
9. Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 438.
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intervened."' 0 The court rejected defendants' arguments saying, "[clontinuity
in such circumstances is not broken by the exercise of volition . . . The law
does not discriminate between the rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who
counts the cost."" It would seem that the purposeful acts of the plaintiff here
are no different in "kind" than the acts in Wagner. In the instant case an essen-
tially similar situation existed, the difference being that the emergency and
rescue were not situated as closely together in time, and the plaintiff here had
a longer period of time to choose her course of action. But the rescuer may
weigh and deliberate,' 2 and so the fact that this was not a stimulus-response
type situation should play no part in defeating plaintiff's claim. The relevant fact
is that the victim of defendants' negligence was still in a periled situation when
plaintiff acted.
Another objection to utilization of the rescue doctrine raised by the instant
court is that "[t]he conduct of the plaintiff herein is a clearly defined, indepen-
dent, intervening act with full knowledge of the consequences."'"3 "[U]nder the
'rescue doctrine,' efforts to protect the personal safety of another have been
held not to supersede the liability for the original negligence which has en-
dangered it."'1 4 Thus, "rescue" is not such an independent, intervening act
which cuts off, or supersedes the original negligence. It is difficult to understand
the plaintiff's acts being termed "independent." But for the defendants' negli-
gence, there would not have been such an act by the plaintiff; the consequence
of defendants' negligence demanded such action by someone, if the plaintiff's
son's life was to be saved.15
A possible objection not raised by the present court concerns foreseeability.Y'
Specifically, could the plaintiff have foreseen the risk of rescue? Professor Pros-
ser writes, regarding the rescuer, "it has been recognized since the early case of
the crowd rushing to assist the descending balloonist that he is nothing ab-
normal."'17 Cardozo said: "The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may
not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.""'
It seems clear that whether we say the rescuer is foreseeable or not the negli-
gent party will be held liable.19
Another requirement usually placed on the rescue doctrine plaintiff is a
showing that "the end to be gained [was] fairly commensurate with the risks
incurred."20 This is usually a jury question.2 ' In the instant case, the plaintiff
lo. Id.
11. Id. at 181, 133 N.E. at 438.
12. Id.
13. 55 Misc. 2d at 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
14. W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 316.
15. 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 55 (1941).
16. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
17. W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 316 (footnote omitted).
18. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).
19. 3 0. Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts § 1, at 284-85 (1941).
20. Wardrop v. Santi Moving & Express Co., 233 N.Y. 227, 229, 135 N.E. 272 (1922); -ee
38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 228 (1941) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 472 (1965).
21. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).
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gained a life by giving up a kidney. It would seem that the risk taken was
commensurate with the result gained.
When the court here considered some of the famous rescue doctrine cases,22
it concluded that "in each ... [case], the rescuer acted without knowing his
fate." 23 This conclusion is not accurate 24 and even if it were, it would not impose
any requirement upon the plaintiff which would deny the application of the "res-
cue doctrine." The plaintiff did not actually know she would suffer ill health, for
this is not a necessary or certain result of losing one kidney. The extent of her
knowledge was that she would give up one kidney in order to save a life. This
is in essence no different than walking along a trestle for 445 feet to rescue a
fallen passenger as was the situation in Wagner. In the rescue doctrine cases,20,
each "rescuer" knew of his immediate physical act; none had "full" knowledge
of the consequences. But even if such consequences were known, that prior
knowledge would not require denial of recovery to the plaintiff. Such a plaintiff
can intentionally go to the rescue and yet recover as long as plaintiff's conduct
is not wanton and the risk taken is sensible. As Justice Cardozo phrased it, "The
risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion.12 0 It is unlikely
that anyone would say that a rescuer in bare feet, who runs to save an infant
lying on railroad tracks, knowing fully the consequences of his act (cut feet),
could not recover from the negligent party involved simply because the rescuer
knew such a result would occur. The rescuer will not be denied relief simply
because he "counts the cost ' 27 or the consequences of his merciful act.
The answer to the issue raised by the court, "Does a cause of action exist in
favor of a donor of a human organ against defendants who removed vital human
organs from the donee in a negligent manner?" should be "yes," using negligence
as the plaintiff's theory and the rescue doctrine specifically as the grounds on
which to predicate relief.
22. Id.; Gibney v. State, 137 N.Y. 1, 33 N.E. 142 (1893); Eckert v. Long Island R.R.,
43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
23. 55 Misc. 2d at 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
24. A man leaping in front of an approaching train presumably knows his own fate.
Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). Likewise, a man jumping from a trestle
into a river presumably anticipated his fate. Gibney v. State, 137 N.Y. 1, 33 N.E. 142 (1893).
A man walking along a trestle at night presumably knows that he might fall. Wagner v.
International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
25. See supra note 22.
26. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921). The
judge in the instant case said that "Judge Cardozo excluded from the rescue doctrine a
'wanton' (wilful) act on the part of the rescuer," 55 Misc. 2d at 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712,
and therefore denied recovery because of the 'wilful' act of plaintiff. However, Black's Law
Dictionary defines "wanton" as "reckless, heedless, . . .fool hardiness," Black's Law Dictio-
nary 1753 (4th ed. 1951) ; and Cardozo says "continuity ... is not broken by the exercise of
volition." Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437, 439 (1921).
The conclusion to be drawn is that the instant court did not accurately interpret Cardozo's
use of the word "wanton." Cardozo excluded from the rescue doctrine a wanton (foolish)
act not a wanton (wilful) act.
27. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).
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